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Abstract
Response time and accuracy are fundamental measures of behavioral science, but discerning participants’ underlying
abilities can be masked by speed–accuracy trade-offs (SATOs). SATOs are often inadequately addressed in experiment
analyses which focus on a single variable or which involve a suboptimal analytic correction. Models of decision-making,
such as the drift diffusion model (DDM), provide a principled account of the decision-making process, allowing the recovery
of SATO-unconfounded decision parameters from observed behavioral variables. For plausible parameters of a typical
between-groups experiment, we simulate experimental data, for both real and null group differences in participants’ ability
to discriminate stimuli (represented by differences in the drift rate parameter of the DDM used to generate the simulated
data), for both systematic and null SATOs. We then use the DDM to fit the generated data. This allows the direct comparison
of the specificity and sensitivity for testing of group differences of different measures (accuracy, reaction time, and the
drift rate from the model fitting). Our purpose here is not to make a theoretical innovation in decision modeling, but to use
established decision models to demonstrate and quantify the benefits of decision modeling for experimentalists. We show,
in terms of reduction of required sample size, how decision modeling can allow dramatically more efficient data collection
for set statistical power; we confirm and depict the non-linear speed–accuracy relation; and we show how accuracy can be a
more sensitive measure than response time given decision parameters which reasonably reflect a typical experiment.
Keywords Speed-accuracy trade-off · Drift-diffusion model · Statistical power · Response time · Accuracy
Abbreviations
DDM - Drift diffusion model
SATO - Speed–accuracy trade-off
Introduction
Speed–accuracy trade-offs
Speed and accuracy of responding are fundamental mea-
sures of performance, collected by behavioral scientists
across diverse domains in an attempt to track participants’
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underlying capacities. As well as being affected by the
capacity of participants to respond quickly and accurately,
the two measures are also related by participants’ strategic
choices of a speed–accuracy trade-off (SATO; for reviews
see Heitz, 2014; Wickelgren, 1977).
The SATO confounds measurement of participant
capacity—which means that we cannot directly read either
speed or accuracy as an index of participant ability. The
SATO is inherent to decision-making—it arises whenever
we wish to respond as fast and as accurately as possible
based on uncertain incoming information. More accurate
responses require more information, which takes longer
to accumulate; faster responses forgo collecting additional
information at the cost of higher error rates. Importantly,
because the SATO is unavoidable, it is also necessary that
all decision-making processes are positioned with respect to
the trade-off. This does not need to be done deliberately or
explicitly, but any decision process can be characterized as
adopting some trade-off between speed and accuracy. For
the tasks studied by psychologists, it is important to recog-
nize that there will be individual differences, as well as task
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and group-related differences, in how participants position
themselves on the SATO.
Outside of research focused on SATOs explicitly,
different practices have been adopted to account for SATOs
or potential SATOs in behavioral data. One approach is
to ignore either speed or accuracy. For example, ignoring
speed of response is common in psychophysics, whereas
some domains of cognitive psychology where high accuracy
is assumed, focus only on response times (e.g., Stafford,
Ingram, & Gurney, 2011),1 albeit sometimes after a cursory
check that standard null-hypothesis tests do not reveal
significant differences in error rates. Another approach is to
combine speed and accuracy. For example, in the domain
of visual search it is common to calculate ‘efficiency’
scores by dividing search time by search accuracy as a
proportion (e.g., Yates & Stafford, 2018, June). Despite
being widespread, there is evidence that this practice is
unlikely to add clarity to analysis (Bruyer & Brysbaert,
2011). We also note that the researchers who initially
formulated the efficiency score explicitly counseled against
using it in the case of SATOs (Townsend & Ashby, 1983).
The efficiency score shares the property with other recent
suggestions for accounting for SATOs (Davidson & Martin,
2013; Seli, Jonker, Cheyne, & Smilek, 2013) that it assumes
a linear relation between response time and accuracy. While
such approaches may be better than focusing on a single
behavioral variable, the assumption of linearity is at odds
with work which has explicitly characterized the SATO
(Fitts, 1966; Heitz, 2014; Wickelgren, 1977) and has shown
a distinctly curvilinear relation between response time and
accuracy. As such, although linear correction methods may
work for some portions of the SATO curve, they are likely
to be misleading, or at least fail to add clarity, where
accuracy and/or speed approaches upper or lower limits
of those variables. Recently, Liesefeld and Janczyk (2019)
showed that several current methods for combing speed and
accuracy to correct for SATOs are in fact sensitive to the
very SATOs they are designed to account for. These authors
advocate the balanced integration score (BIS; Liesefeld,
Fu, & Zimmer, 2015) as an alternative, but it seems likely
that the combination of speed and accuracy remains an
estimation problem of some delicacy, especially in the
presence of SATOs.
Context
The unprincipled combination of speed and accuracy mea-
sures becomes an urgent issue when considered in the
context of widespread questions surrounding the reliability
1Note that we choose to cite work by the lead author here for
illustration, rather than highlight any other researchers for their use of
these suboptimal practices.
of the literature in psychology. Established results fail to
replicate, or replicate with substantially reduced effect sizes
(Open Science Collaboration, 2015; Pashler & Wagenmak-
ers, 2012).
Low statistical power has been a persistent problem
across many areas of psychology and cognitive neuro-
science (Button et al., 2013; Lovakov & Agadullina, 2017,
November; Maxwell, 2004; Sedlmeier & Gigerenzer, 1989;
Stanley, Carter, & Doucouliagos, 2017; Szucs & Ioanni-
dis, 2017), including, but not limited to, research areas
which are bound by costly methods or hard-to-reach popu-
lations (Bezeau & Graves, 2001; Cohen, 1962; Geuter, Qi,
Welsh, Wager, & Lindquist, 2018). This, combined with
factors such as analytic flexibility (Silberzahn et al., 2017;
Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011)—which can only
be increased by the lack of a single standard method for
accounting for SATOs—has led to a widespread loss of faith
in many published results (Ioannidis, 2005).
Statistical power is defined with respect to the variability
and availability of data, as well as the analysis proposed.
For a set experimental design, an obvious candidate for
increasing statistical power is to increase sample size, but
this is not always easy. Each additional participant costs
additional time, money and resources. This is especially
true in the case of expensive methods, such as fMRI, or
special populations which may be hard to recruit. More
sensitive measures also increase statistical power: lower
measurement error will tend to reduce variability so that the
same mean differences produce larger observed effect sizes.
A motivation for the present work is to demonstrate the
practical utility, in terms of increased statistical power, of
combining speed and accuracy information in a principled
manner using decision models. Such an innovation has
the appeal of making the most of data which is normally
collected, even if not analyzed, while not requiring more
participants (which is costly), or more trials per participant
(which also has costs in terms of participant fatigue, which
may be especially high for some populations, e.g., children).
Decisionmodeling
Models of the decision-making process provide the founda-
tion for the principled combination of speed and accuracy
data, and thus afford experimenters access to considerable
statistical power gains.
Many models exist in which decision-making is repre-
sented by the accumulation of sensory evidence over time.
When the accumulated evidence surpasses some threshold
(also called a boundary) then a decision is triggered. The
accuracy of the decision depends on which accumulator
crosses which boundary; the speed is given by time this
takes, and thus such models can be used to fit speed and
accuracy data within the same framework.
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A prominent instance of such accumulator models is
the so called drift-diffusion model developed by Roger
Ratcliff (DDM, Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998).
In these models, the rate at which evidence is accumulated
is represented by the drift rate parameter, which can
be thought of as co-determined by the sensitivity of
perceiver and the strength of the stimulus. After a long
and successful period of development and application on
purely behavioral data, the DDM model was at the center
of an important theoretical confluence. Neurophysiologists
found evidence for accumulation like processes in neurons
critical to sensory decision-making (Gold & Shadlen, 2001;
Smith & Ratcliff, 2004), while theoreticians recognized
that accumulator models could be related to statistical
methods of uncertain information integration. Under certain
parameterizations, many different decision models, all in
the family of accumulator models, can be shown to be
equivalent to the DDM, and thus in turn equivalent to a
statistical method which is optimal for making the fastest
decision with a given error rate, or the most accurate
decision within a fixed time (Bogacz, Brown, Moehlis,
Holmes, & Cohen, 2006; Gold & Shadlen, 2002).
While debate continues around the exact specification
of the decision model which best reflects human decision-
making, there is a consensus that the DDM captures
many essential features of decision processing (but see
Pirrone, Azab, Hayden, Stafford, & Marshall, 2018;
Pirrone, Stafford, & Marshall, 2014; Teodorescu, Moran,
& Usher, 2016). As you would expect, the DDM has
also shown considerable success modeling decision data
across many different domains (Ratcliff, Smith, & McKoon,
2015; Ratcliff, Smith, Brown, & McKoon, 2016), and
in particular at separating out response thresholds from
stimulus perception (Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008), and in
estimating these reliably (Lerche & Voss, 2017). In the
sense that the DDM implements a statistically optimal
algorithm for accumulation for uncertain information, we
would expect our neural machinery to implement the same
algorithm in the absence of other constraints (Pirrone et al.,
2014). The basic mechanism of the DDM is that of a
single accumulator, similar to that shown in Fig. 1, with the
following key parameters: v, the drift rate which reflects the
rate of evidence accumulation; a, the boundary separation,
which defines the threshold which must be crossed to trigger
a decision and so reflect response conservativeness; z, the
starting point of accumulation (either equidistant between
the two decision thresholds, or closer to one rather than
the other), which biases the response based on pre-stimulus
expectations and Ter , non-decision time, a fixed delay
which does not vary with stimulus information. Additional
parameters define noise factors which set factors such as the
trial-to-trial variability in drift rate.
Fig. 1 Decision-making by evidence accumulation. Here, a single
possible accumulation process is shown (in blue). The rate of
accumulation is determined by incoming sensory evidence as well as
Gaussian noise. The response is determined when the accumulator
value on the y-axis crosses the upper or lower threshold (dashed lines;
in this case, Decision A is triggered). The response time is determined
by the distance the accumulator travels on the x-axis (time)
For our purposes, the value of these decision models is that
they provide a principled reconciliation of speed and accuracy
data. Within this framework, these observed behavioral
measures reflect the hidden parameters of the decision
model, most important of which are the drift rate (reflecting
the rate of evidence accumulation) and the decision
boundary separation (reflecting the conservativeness of the
participant’s decision criterion; higher boundaries produce
slower but more accurate responses).
By fitting the DDM to our data, we can deconfound the
observed behavioral variables—speed and accuracy—and
recover the putative generating parameters of the decision—
drift and boundary separation. In principle, this allows a
more sensitive measure of participant capability (reflected
in the drift parameter). Drift is a more sensitive measure
because (a) it is estimated using both speed and accuracy,
(b) this estimation takes account of both mean response
time and the distribution of response times for correct
and error responses, and because (c) the estimation of
the drift parameter is isolated from the effect of different
participant’s SATOs (which are reflected in the boundary
parameter).
Prior work
Previous authors have established the principled benefits
of this approach (Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008). Within a
psychophysics framework, Stone (2014) extended Palmer,
Huk, and Shadlen (2005)’s decision model to show that
response time and accuracy contain different, but possibly
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overlapping, components of Shannon information about the
perceived stimulus. If these components do not overlap
(as suggested by Stone, in preparation) then combining
response time and accuracy data should provide better
estimates of key parameters, which govern the decision
process than relying on either response time or accuracy
alone. However, our purpose here is not to make a
theoretical innovation in decision modeling, but to use
established decision models to demonstrate and quantify the
benefits of decision modeling for experimentalists.
Previous authors have shown for specific paradigms
and decisions that using decision models confers benefits
beyond relying on speed, accuracy or some sub-optimal
combination of the two, especially in the case of speed–
accuracy trade-offs (Park and Starns, 2015; Zhang & Rowe,
2014). These results use data collected from participants
in single experiments. Park and Starns (2015) show that
for their data using decision models to estimate a drift
parameter allows participant ability to be gauged separately
from speed–accuracy trade-offs, and that these estimates
consequently have higher predictive value. Zhang and Rowe
(2014) used decision modeling to show that, for their
data, it was possible to dissociate behavioral changes due
to learning from those due to speed–accuracy trade-offs
(revealing the distinct mechanisms of these two processes).
In contrast to these studies, our approach is to use simulated
data of multiple experiments so as to interrogate the value
of decision models across a wide range of possibilities.
Ravenzwaaij, Donkin, and Vandekerckhov (2017, hence-
forth vRDV) have considerable sympathy with the approach
we adopt here. They show that the EZ model, for across vari-
ations in participant number, trial number and effect size,
has higher sensitivity to group differences than the full dif-
fusion model, which they ascribe to its relative simplicity (a
striking illustration of the bias/variance trade-off in model
fitting, Yarkoni & Westfall, 2017).
Contribution of the current work
Our work extends prior work in a number of ways. Our
fundamental comparison is in the sensitivity of model
parameters compared to behaviorally observed measures
(RT, accuracy). Our purpose is not to compare different
‘measurement models’ (Ravenzwaaij et al., 2017), but
to illustrate the benefits for experimentalists of using
any decision model over analyzing a singular behavioral
measure (reaction time or accuracy in isolation). We use
the EZ model, for reasons of computational efficiency, and
because prior work has shown that in most circumstances
it preserves the benefits of fuller decision modeling
approaches. We also confirm that the basic pattern of results
holds for other model fitting methods, the HDDM (Wiecki,
Sofer, & Frank, 2013) and fast-dm (Voss & Voss, 2007).
We simulate null group effects and so can show false alarm
rates as well as calculate results in terms of d’. Our use
of d’ allows quantitative comparison and estimation of size
of benefit across different speed–accuracy conditions. We
explore the combined effects of group shifts in both drift and
boundary, and so can show implications of speed–accuracy
trade-offs between groups, alongside drift differences. As
with all modeling work, the results we present have
always been latent in existing models. Our focus is not on
theoretical innovation, but in drawing out the implications
of established models in a way that reveals the extent of
their value and so promotes their uptake. For a discussion of
the contribution of elaborating the consequences of existing
models see Stafford (2009, 2010).
Our results are translated into the power-sample size
space, which is familiar to experimental psychologists. Our
results are accompanied by an interactive data explorer to
aid in the translation of the value of decision models into a
form most easily comprehendible by experimentalists. For
these reasons, we hope that the current work can make a
contribution in allowing experimentalists with less model-
fitting experience to readily apprehend the large benefits of
model fitting for decision-making data.
Method
The broad approach is to consider a simple standard
experimental design: a between-groups comparison, where
each group contains a number of participants who complete
a number of decision trials, providing both response time
and accuracy data. We simulate data for true and null
differences in drift rate between the groups, as well as true
and null differences in boundary between the groups. By
varying the number of simulated participants, we generate
a fixed number of ‘scenarios’ defined by true/null effects in
ability (drift) between groups, true/null SATOs (boundary)
between groups and experiment sample size. We keep the
number of decision trials per participant constant for all
these analyses. For each scenario, we simulate many virtual
experiments and inspect the behavioral measures to see how
sensitive and specific they are to true group differences.
We also fit the DDM and estimate the participant drift
parameters, similarly asking how sensitive and specific
estimates of drift are to true group differences. An overview
of the method is illustrated in Fig. 2.
Decisionmodeling
To generate simulated response data, we use the hierar-
chical drift diffusion model (HDDM, 2013). The toolbox
can also perform model fitting, which uses Bayesian esti-
mation methods to simultaneously fit individual decision
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Fig. 2 Overview of method: A between-groups experiment is simu-
lated whereby there simulated participants have decision parameters
(drift and boundary separation) sampled from defined distributions.
From these defined distributions, which contain either a true or null
difference between groups, simulated participants are sampled. From
these sampled participant-level parameters, simulated decisions are
generated, using the DDM, which generates behavioral outcome vari-
ables (RT and accuracy). For each participant, these outcome variables
are modeled using the DDM to recover an estimated drift parameter.
A test of group differences is then performed on the generated accu-
racy and RTs and on the estimated drifts. This is compared to the
known difference in drift to categorize the test as correctly detecting a
true difference between groups in participant discrimination (a hit), or
incorrectly detecting a difference when there is none (a false alarm).
Over many simulated experiments, and a range of parameter values for
simulated sample size and size of true group differences in drift, the
average probability of a hit and a false alarm, and the sensitivity (d’)
are calculated
parameters and the group distributions from which they are
drawn.
While the HDDM offers a principled and comprehen-
sive model fitting approach, it is computationally expen-
sive. An alternative model fitting method, the EZ-DDM
(Wagenmakers, Van Der Maas, & Grasman, 2007) offers
a simple approximation, fitting a decision model with a
smaller number of parameters, assuming no bias towards
either of the two options and no inter-trial variability. This
allows an analytic solution which is computationally cheap.
Furthermore, the EZ-DDM has been shown to match the full
DDM for a range of situations (Ravenzwaaij et al., 2017).
For the model fitting presented here (Figs. 5–8), we use
the EZ-DDM, although initial exploration using both the
HDDM and the fast-dm (Voss & Voss, 2007, a third model
fitting framework) found qualitatively similar results, so our
current belief is that these results do not depend on the
particular decision model deployed from the broad class of
accumulator models.2
Obviously, where we wish to simulate many thousands
of independent experiments there are significant speed
gains from parallelization. Parallelization was done by Mike
Croucher, and the code run on University of Sheffield High
Performance Computing cluster. A sense of the value of
2Computational constraints mean that systematically confirming this
by fully exploring the parameter space presented in this manuscript
must be future work.
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parallelization can be had by noting the data shown in,
for example, Fig. 8 would have taken around one calendar
month to generate on a single high-performance machine,
even though they use the computationally ‘cheap’ EZ-DDM
method. Python code for running the simulations, as well as
the output data, figures and manuscript preparation files, is
here https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.2648995.
Analysis
Because we are not generating a comprehensive analytic
solution for the full DDM we cannot claim that our findings
are true for all situations. Our aim is merely to show
that, for some reasonable choices of DDM parameters,
using decision modeling is a superior approach to analyzing
response time or accuracy alone, and to quantify the gain in
statistical power.
To be able to make this claim of relevance of our
simulations to typical psychology experiments, we need to
be able to justify that our parameter choice is plausible
for a typical psychology experiment. In order to establish
this, we pick parameters which generate response times
of the order of 1 s and accuracy of the order 90%.
Each participant contributes 40 trials (decisions) to each
experiment. Parameters for drift and boundary separation
are defined for the group and individual participant values
for these parameters are drawn from the group parameters
with some level of variability (and, in the case of true
effects, a mean difference between the group values, see
below for details).
To illustrate this, we show in Fig. 3 a direct visualization
of the speed–accuracy trade-off, by taking the base
Fig. 3 Directly visualizing the speed–accuracy trade-off: average
response time and accuracy from a single simulated participant with all
decision parameters kept fixed except for boundary separation, which
is drawn from a normal distribution (mean = 2, variance = 1). 1000
simulated experiments, each of 40 trials
parameters we use in our simulated experiments and
generating a single participant’s average response time and
accuracy, using 1000 different boundary separation values.
This shows the effect of varying boundary separation alone,
while all other decision parameters are stable.
Simulating experimental data
For each scenario, we simulate a large number of
experiments, testing a group (“A”) of participants against
another group (“B”), with each participant contributing 40
trials. Participant parameters (most importantly the drift
rate and boundary parameters) are sampled each time
from distributions defined for each of the two simulated
experimental groups, A and B. For the simulations with no
true difference in sensitivity between A and B the drift rate
of each group has a mean of 2 and within-group standard
deviation of 0.05. For the simulations with a true difference
in drift group B has a mean of 2 + δ, where δ defines an
increase in the mean drift rate; the within-group standard
deviations remain the same. For the simulations where there
is no SATO, the mean boundary parameter is 2, with a
within-group standard deviation of 0.05. For the simulations
where there is a SATO, the boundary parameter of group
B has an average of 2 − δ, where δ defines the size of the
decrease in the mean boundary; the within-group standard
deviations remain the same.
All simulations assume a non-decision time of 0.3 s, no
initial starting bias towards either decision threshold and the
inter-trial variability parameters for starting point, drift and
non-decision time set to 0. Sample sizes between 10 and 400
participants were tested, moving in steps of ten participants
for samples sizes below 150 and steps of 50 for samples
sizes above 150. For each sample size 10,000 simulated
experiments were run (each of 40 simulated participants in
each of two groups).
Effect sizes, observed and declared
The difference between two groups can be expressed
in terms of Cohen’s d effect size—the mean difference
between the groups standardized by the within-group
standard deviation. For the observed variables, response
time and accuracy, effect sizes can only be observed since
these arise from the interaction of the DDM parameters
and the DDM model which generates responses. For drift
rate, the difference between groups is declared (by how we
define the group means, see above). The declared group
difference in drift rate produces the observed effect size in
response time and accuracy (which differ from each other),
depending on both the level of noise in each simulated
experiment, and the experiment design, particularly on the
number of trials per participant. Experiment designs which
Behav Res
Fig. 4 How differences in drift convert to observed differences in
response time and accuracy (40 trials per ppt). Effect sizes for observed
behavioral measures that are within the range typically observed by
experimentalists are generated by larger actual differences in the
underlying decision parameters
have a higher number of trials per participant effectively
sample the true drift rate more accurately, and so have effect
sizes for response time and accuracy which are closer to the
“true”, declared, effect size in drift rate.
This issue sheds light on why decision modeling is more
effective than analyzing response time or accuracy alone
(because it recovers the generating parameter, drift, which
is more sensitive to group differences), and why there are
differences in power between measuring response time and
accuracy (because these variables show different observed
effect sizes when generated by the same true different in
drift rates). Figure 4 shows how declared differences in drift
translate into observed effect sizes for response time and
accuracy.
Hits (power) and false alarms (alpha)
For each simulated experiment, any difference between
groups is gauged with a standard two-sample t test.3
Statistical power is the probability of your measure
reporting a group difference when there is a true group
difference, analogous to the “hit rate” in a signal detection
paradigm. Conventional power analysis assumes a standard
false positive (alpha) rate of 0.05. For our simulations, we
can measure the actual false-alarm rate, rather than assume
it remains at the intended 0.05 rate.
For situations where only the drift differs between two
groups, we would not expect any significant variations
3Note, for high-accuracy values, t tests may not be appropriate (they
are strictly not applicable to proportions anyway, but this may become
a real issue for values very close to 1 or 0).
in false-alarm rate. However, when considering speed–
accuracy trade-off changes between groups (with or without
drift rate differences as well) the situation is different. This
means that it is possible to get false positives in tests of a
difference in drifts between groups because of SATOs. Most
obviously, if a SATO means one group prioritizes speed
over accuracy, analysis of response time alone will mimic
an enhanced drift rate, but analysis of accuracy alone will
mimic degraded drift rate. Ideally, the DDM will be immune
to any distortion of estimates of drift rates, but that is what
we have set out to demonstrate so we should not assume.
The consequence of this is that it makes sense to calculate
the overall sensitivity, accounting for both the false-alarm
rate, as well as the hit rate. A principled way for combining
false alarm and hit rate into a single metric is d’ (“d prime”),
which gives an overall sensitivity of the test, much as we
would calculate the sensitivity independent of bias for an
observer in a psychophysics experiment (Green & Swets,
1966).
Results
The results shown here support our central claim that decision
modeling can have substantial benefits. To explore the inter-
action of power, sample size, effect size, and measure sen-
sitivity, we have prepared an interactive data explorer which
can be found here https://sheffield-university.shinyapps.io/
decision power/ (Krystalli & Stafford, 2019, May).
Without speed–accuracy trade-offs
For an idea of the main implications, it is sufficient to plot a
slice of the data when the true difference in drift is a Cohen’s
d of 2. Recall from Fig. 4 above that although this is a large
difference in terms of the generating parameter, drift, this
translates into small observed effect sizes in accuracy and
response time (approximately 0.3–0.4, reflecting ‘medium’
effect sizes).
Figure 5, left, shows how sample size and hit rate
interact for the different measures. The results will be
depressingly familiar to any experimentalist who has taken
power analysis seriously—a sample size far larger than that
conventionally recruited is required to reach adequate power
levels for small/medium group differences.
From this figure, we can read off the number of
participants per group required to reach the conventional
80% power level (equivalent to hit rate of 0.8, if we assume
a constant false-positive rate). For this part of the parameter
space, for this size of difference between groups in drift, and
no speed–accuracy trade-off, ∼140 participants are required
to achieve 80% power if the difference between groups
is tested on the speed of correct responses only. If the
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Fig. 5 Hit rate and false-alarm rate against simulated experiment sample size, no speed–accuracy trade-off; comparing a between groups Cohen’s
d effect size in the drift parameter of 2 (left) with 0 (right)
difference between groups is tested on the accuracy rate
only, then ∼115 participants per group are required. If speed
and accuracy are combined using decision modeling, and
difference between groups is tested on the recovered drift
parameters, then we estimate that ∼55 participants per group
are required for 80% power. An experimentalist who might
have otherwise had to recruit 280 (or 230) participants could
therefore save herself (and her participants) significant
trouble, effort, and cost by deploying decision modeling,
recruiting half that sample size and still enjoying an increase
in statistical power to detect group differences.
Figure 5, right, shows the false-alarm rate. When the
difference in drifts is a Cohen’s d of 0, i.e., no true
difference, the t tests on response time and accuracy both
generate false-alarm rates at around the standard alpha level
of 0.05.
Figure 6 shows the measure sensitivity, d’ for each
sample size. In effect, this reflects the hit rate (Fig. 5, left)
corrected for fluctuations in false-alarm rate (Fig. 5, right).
This correction will be more important when there are
systematic variations in false-positive rate due to SATOs.
Note that the exact value of d’ is sensitive to small
fluctuations in the proportions of hits and false alarms
observed in the simulations, and hence the d’ curves are
visibly kinked despite being derived from the apparently
smooth hit and false-alarm curves.
Fig. 6 Measure sensitivity (d’) against simulated experiment sample size, no speed–accuracy trade-off; comparing a between-groups Cohen’s d
effect size in the drift parameter of 2 (hits) with 0 (false alarms)
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Fig. 7 Hit rate and false-alarm rate against simulated experiment sample size, with a speed–accuracy trade-off (lowered decision boundary);
comparing a between groups Cohen’s d effect size in the drift parameter of 2 (left) with 0 (right), and the boundary parameter also differing
between groups with a Cohen’s d effect size of 2
With SATOs
The superiority of parameter recovery via a decision model
becomes even more stark if there are systematic speed–
accuracy trade-offs. To see this, we re-run the simulations
above, but with a shift in the boundary parameter between
group A and group B, such that individuals from group B
have a lower boundary, and so tend to make faster but less
accurate decisions compared to group A. On top of this
difference, we simulate different sizes of superiority of drift
rate of group B over group A.
For the plots below, the drift rate difference is, as above
in the non-SATO case, 0.1 (which, given the inter-individual
variability translates into an effect size of 2). The boundary
parameter difference is also 0.1, a between group effect size
2.
Unlike the case where there are no SATOs, the response
time measure is now superior for detecting a group
difference over the drift measure; Fig. 7, left.
This, however, is an artifact of the SATO. If the boundary
shift had been in the reverse direction then accuracy, not
response time, would appear the superior measure (see
Fig. 8 Measure sensitivity (d’) against simulated experiment sample size, no speed–accuracy trade-off (lowered decision boundary); comparing a
between groups Cohen’s d effect size in the drift parameter of 2 (hits) with 0 (false alarms) as well as a between-groups Cohen’s d effect size of 2
in the boundary parameter
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Fig. 9 Hit rate and false-alarm rate against simulated experiment sample size, with a speed–accuracy trade-off (raised decision boundary);
comparing a between- groups Cohen’s d effect size in the drift parameter of 2 (left) with 0 (right), and the boundary parameter also differing
between groups with a Cohen’s d effect size of 2
below). Once we compare the false-positive rate, the danger
of using a single observed measure becomes clear, Fig. 7,
right.
When using the drift parameter as a measure, the SATO
between the groups does not induce false alarms. The
accuracy measure is insensitive so also does not suffer (but
would if the boundary shift was in the opposite direction).
The response time measure is catastrophically sensitive to
false alarms, approaching 100% false-alarm rate with larger
samples.
Figure 8 shows d’, which combines hit rate and the false-
alarm rate, shows that the best measure overall is drift rate,
as it is in the no-SATO case.
To confirm our intuitions concerning the effect of a
raised decision boundary, as a opposed to a lowered one,
we repeat the simulations with the boundary raised up by
the same amount as it was lowered for the results shown
in Figs. 7 & 8. The results are shown in Figs. 9 & 10.
Comparing Fig. 9 with Fig. 7, we can see that, with a
raised boundary, the accuracy appears the superior measure
Fig. 10 Measure sensitivity (d’) against simulated experiment sample size, no speed–accuracy trade-off (raised decision boundary); comparing a
between-groups Cohen’s d effect size in the drift parameter of 2 (hits) with 0 (false alarms) as well as a between-groups Cohen’s d effect size of
2 in the boundary parameter
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if hits alone are considered (left), but not if false alarms
are taken into account (right). With the boundary raised,
and hence more conservative responses, response time is
less sensitive to group differences. As with the lowered
boundary, it is possible to combine hits and false alarms
in a single d’ measure (Fig. 10), which shows the same
superiority of the estimated drift measure in comparison to
both raw behavioral measures.
Discussion
Main conclusions
We have shown the benefits of fitting response time
and accuracy data with standard decision models. Such
decision models allow the estimation of the generating
parameters of simple perceptual decisions, such that the
participants’ sensitivity and response conservativeness are
deconfounded. This allows more powerful tests of between-
group differences, given a set sample size and/or the
reduction in required sample for a set statistical power.
Some insight into why decision modeling brings these
benefits can be gained from Fig. 3. Here we show that the
speed–accuracy trade-off exists as the decision threshold
is shifted, and that it has a non-linear shape. Combining
speed and accuracy not only provides more information,
but cannot be done directly, but instead is best done via an
accurate model of the underlying decision processes (such
as the DDM).
Inter alia our results show that accuracy can be a
more sensitive measure than response time given decision
parameters which reasonably reflect a typical experiment.
This confirms, in simulation, the result of Ratcliff and
McKoon (2008) whose analysis of 18 experimental data
sets showed that accuracy better correlated with participant
drift rate than response time. Our results also provide some
insight into why this is. Figure 4 shows that standard
between-group effect size is more closely matched by
generated accuracy than generated response times.
In the presence of systematic shifts in the speed–
accuracy trade-off, this approach offers protection against
false positives or false negatives (in the case that SATOs
disguise true differences in sensitivity). Interestingly, under
the parameter range used in these simulations, calculation of
the d’ sensitivity measure shows that accuracy outperforms
response time for SATO in both directions (whether more
liberal, Fig. 8, or more conservative, Fig. 10).
We do not claim to make theoretical innovation in deci-
sion modeling—the work deploys widely used decision
models ‘off the shelf’ and seeks to quantify the extent of the
benefit for experimentalists of deploying decision modeling
on their behavioral data. The extent of the statistical power
gain is considerable. The exact benefit will vary according to
the phenomenon and populations investigated, as well as
experimental design. For the example design and parameter
regime we showcase here, the use of decision modeling allows
total sample size to be halved while still increasing sta-
tistical power. To explore the relation of sample size and
effect size to the sensitivity of behavioral measures, and
the decision modeling measures, we provide an interactive
data explorer here https://sheffield-university.shinyapps.io/
decision power/ (Krystalli & Stafford, 2019, May).
Qualifications
The results we showcase here and in the data explorer hold
only for the parameter regime chosen. We have not analytically
proved that parameter recovery with the DDM will always
provide a statistical power gain. We have chosen a simple
experimental design, with a plausible trial numbers per
participant and decision parameters which generate realistic
values for speed and accuracy of responses, but it is possible
that for smaller effects, at the boundaries of maximum or
minimum speed or accuracy, and/or with higher within and
between participant noise, that decision modeling may not
have the benefits depicted here (although it may also have
greater benefits than those depicted here as well).
We have chosen not to explore a within-participants
design because the issue of systematically different speed–
accuracy trade-offs between conditions seems, prima
facie, less likely. For between-groups designs, we know
of several prominent cases where systematic SATOs
confounded conclusions. For example, Pirrone, Dickinson,
Gomez, Stafford, and Milne (2017) found that an apparent
impairment of perceptual judgment among autism spectrum
disorder (ASD) participants could be attributed to a
difference in their SATO. The ASD group responded
more conservatively, but decision modeling showed they
had equivalent sensitivity to the non-ASD group. Ratcliff,
Thapar, and McKoon (2006) found an analogous result for
young vs. old participants on perceptual discrimination and
recognition memory tasks.
We expect the statistical power gains of decision
modeling to apply to within-participants designs. All
other things being equal, between-groups designs have
lower statistical power than within-participants designs,
so it is for between-groups designs, which we assume
an experimentalist would only deploy if they had no
alternative, that decision modeling brings the greatest gains.
As well as occupying a particular point in the parameter
space of decision models, our results are also generated
using a particular model and model-fitting approach
(the EZ-DDM, Wagenmakers et al., 2007), although we
have verified that the same qualitative pattern can be
produced by alternative approaches (Voss & Voss, 2007;
Wiecki et al., 2013). Additionally, it is worth noting
Behav Res
that for some parameterizations several prominent decision
models are equivalent (Bogacz et al., 2006). A recent
collaborative analysis project found that despite a large
diversity of fitting methods, common inferences were made
across different decision models (Dutilh et al. 2016). A
reasonable conclusion from this project was that in many
circumstances, the simple models should be preferred
(Lerche & Voss, 2016). Ratcliff and Childers (2015) claim
that hierarchical Bayesian methods of fitting, as used by
the HDDM are best, at least for individual difference
investigations (although see Jones & Dzhafarov, 2014 who
claim that many variants of the DDM cannot be successfully
distinguished by empirical measurement). Although we
have not verified this, we expect to obtain similar results
with many established models of decision-making, e.g., the
LBA (Brown & Heathcote, 2008) or the LCA (Usher &
McClelland, 2001), since we have no reason to suspect that
our results are only dependent on the specific decision-
making model used and rather depend on the established
ability of a wide class of decision models to capture the
regularities in behavioral data from human decisions.
Wider context
As well as power gains, and protection against SATO
confounds, decision modeling has other benefits to offer the
experimentalist. It allows differences between participants
or groups to be localized to particular components of the
decision process. Decision modeling, since it relies on the
distribution of responses rather than just the means, can
also reveal underlying differences when single variables
(e.g., response time) are stable (White, Ratcliff, Vasey, &
McKoon, 2010).
There is a growing awareness of the limitations of
studying only speed or accuracy alone (Oppenheim, 2017).
A recent meta-analysis confirms a low correlation between
speed and accuracy costs in psychological tasks (Hedge,
Powell, Bompas, Vivian-Griffiths, & Sumner, in press).
Vandierendonck (2017) compares seven transformations
which combine reaction time and accuracy, without use of
decision modeling, but finds none unambiguously superior
either to the others or to inspecting raw reaction time and
accuracy.
Related work
A recent paper (Hedge, Powell, & Sumner, 2018) used
a comparable simulation-based approach and reached a
similar conclusion to ours—that model-free transformations
of reaction time and accuracy, even if hallowed by common
usage, are outperformed by a model-based transformation,
which assumes a sequential sampling model like the DDM.
White, Servant, and Logan (2018) also present a parame-
ter recovery account, but compare different variations of the
sequential sampling models which are designed to account
for decisions under conflict. Their focus is on comparing bet-
ween different decision models rather than model-free and
model-based transformations of reaction time and accuracy.
Baker et al. (2019) used the simulation method to address
a question of equal importance to experimentalists—how
does the number of trials interact with sample size to
affect statistical power? Like us, they present an interactive
demonstration of their findings https://shiny.york.ac.uk/
powercontours/
Getting started with decisionmodeling
Those who wish to apply decision models to their data
have a range of tutorials and introductory reviews available
(Forstmann, Ratcliff, & Wagenmakers, 2016; Voss, Nagler,
& Lerche, 2013), as well as statistical computing packages
which support model fitting (Voss & Voss, 2007; Wiecki-
etal:2013). Although analyzing speed and accuracy data
with decision models incurs a technical overhead, we
hope we have made clear the considerable gains in both
enhanced sensitivity to true differences and protection
against spurious findings that it affords.
Conclusions
Decision modeling offers large benefits to the experimen-
talist, and is based on a principled framework that has seen
substantial validation and exploration. No analysis plan can
rescue an ill-conceived study, and experimentalists have
many other considerations which can enhance statistical
power before they attempt decision modeling (Lazic, 2018).
Our attempt here has just been to illustrate how, in cases
where speed and accuracy are collected from two groups of
participants, decision modeling offers considerable power
gains, and the attendant increased chances of discovering a
true effect and/or reduction of required sample size, without
increased risk of false positives. The contribution this paper
hopes to make concerns the size of these benefits. These are
not just, as could be theoretically shown, non-zero, but they
are, under conditions which it is realistic to expect to hold
for a typical experiment, consequential and so worthy of the
experimentalist’s consideration.
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